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Abstract
I study the role of minimum bid increments (MBI) in internet auctions using natural field experiment
data from a Finnish online auction site Huuto.net. Internet auctions are typically viewed as second-
price, implying truthful bidding. However, due to the presence of the MBI, equilibrium bidding behavior
involves bid shading. I sell otherwise identical gift cards while varying the MBI and test between truthful
bidding and bid shading. Truthful bidding is rejected. Consistently with equilibrium behavior, bid
shading increases as the MBI increases. This implies that real-world bidders are capable of reacting
rationally even to seemingly small variations in their strategic environment.
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1 Introduction
Internet auctions (also referred to as online or electronic auctions) account for a large and increasing share
of C2C trading, retail trade (B2C) and B2B trading. The defining feature of most internet auctions is the so
called proxy-bidding, where bidders reveal to the auction server the maximum bid that the server can submit
on their behalf. The server then acts as a proxy and increases the current bid in response to competitive
bids up to the submitted maximum, but where possible, to equal the second-highest bid plus a minimum bid
increment (MBI). The MBI also defines the minimum amount by which a new bid must exceed the current
price for it to be accepted. I argue that in internet auctions, the MBI is an important but empirically largely
overlooked feature of the auction design. The received theory (Bapna et al. 2003, Hickman 2010 and Rogers
et al. 2007) predicts that the MBI may be an important determinant of internet auction bidding strategies
and revenue, and that the revenue maximizing MBI may be higher than zero. I use a novel natural field
experiment conducted in a Finnish online auction site Huuto.net, where a seller can set the MBI freely, to
show that these theoretical predictions are supported by the data. I document that increasing the MBI
increases bid-shading and also seller revenue, but only up to a point limited by an entry deterring eﬀect.
In internet auctions, the MBI aﬀects not only whether a new bid is accepted, but also how the price
is determined. Most importantly, the larger the MBI the larger the likelihood is that the pricing rule is
based on the first-price rather than the second-price mechanism. If the highest and the second-highest proxy
bids are within one MBI of each other, the first-price rule is used, because the current price cannot exceed
the highest bid. Because the MBI adjusts the probability that the pricing rule in a given auction is either
a second-price or a first-price rule, it should have a significant impact on bidder behavior. Accordingly,
Hickman (2010) shows that in equilibrium, bid functions converge towards first-price auction bid functions
as the MBI increases. The main contribution of my paper is that I show by applying a test to my field
experiment data that bidders do indeed account rationally for the MBI in their bidding strategies. It is
generally thought that the equilibrium in internet auctions is equivalent to the equilibrium in sealed bid
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second-price auctions (e.g. Bajari and Hortacsu 2003). The main implication of the results is that internet
auctions should not be modeled as second-price auctions as most of the literature does. To my knowledge,
this is the first field experimental or causal evidence on the topic in the literature.1
The existing gap in both the theoretical and empirical literature concerning the analysis of MBIs could be
due to the seller not being able to set the MBI on large internet auction sites like eBay. Another explanation
is that the MBI has been regarded only as a minor detail of these auctions, since they are typically small
relative to the value of the objects on sale. While their small relative size limits the possible revenue eﬀects,
even relatively small MBIs may have significant implications for the analysis of these auctions. In particular,
Hickman et al. (2011) show that not accounting for the MBI in estimation leads to statistically significantly
diﬀerent structural estimates compared to using a correctly specified model, and the diﬀerences are large
in magnitude. In particular, the estimated valuation distributions diﬀer substantially even with relatively
small MBIs. Besides the analysis of online auctions, my experimental results contribute more generally to
the field experimental evidence on the rationality and strategic behavior of real economic agents in real
auction settings (e.g. Reiley 2006, List and Lucking-Reiley 2000). From this perspective, the possibility that
MBIs may be perceived only as a minor detail of the auction design makes my experimental results more
compelling. In particular, I show that real-world bidders are capable of reacting according to the economic
theory even to seemingly small variations in their strategic environment in ways that can be observed in the
data.
1Zeithammer and Adams (2010) provide novel model validation tests and empirical evidence that the second-price sealed
bid assumption is not the correct one in eBay auctions. They present evidence that while some bidders may submit sealed
bids, a significant number of bidders conduct incremental bidding, where the current price is raised by one MBI at a time
repeatedly up to a valuation. Although they utilize information on MBIs in their tests, they overlook the implications of MBIs
on entry and strategic behavior. With incremental bidding, the top two bids in these auctions no longer reflect the true bidder
valuations. Accordingly, Hortacsu and Nielsen (2010) argue for the importance of incorporating richer models in structural
empirical analysis of online auctions. Hickman et al. (2011) indeed provide a structural estimation technique that accounts for
MBI in a setting with independent private values and exogenous entry.
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2 The experiment
Most internet auction sites, including Huuto.net, are a variant of an ascending auction with a minimum
bid increment and a proxy-bidding system. Proxy refers to the algorithm that will conduct the bidding
in the place of the real person. Submitting only one bid to the proxy is called proxy-bidding. Huuto.net
advises buyers to submit only their true valuation once and let the proxy do the rest, which would result in a
sealed-bid second-price mechanism absent the role of MBI. To understand how the MBI may aﬀect strategies
and revenue, we need to understand how the proxy-bidding system works. For a bid to be accepted, it must
exceed the current bid (or the reservation price for the first bidder) plus the MBI. This is the minimum
amount that the proxy accepts. It is also possible to set any value higher than this to the proxy. The value
entered does not need to follow the grid imposed by the MBI. This implies that even if sellers for some
reason prefer even numbers, the MBI cannot be used to achieve them. Whenever a new bidder informs his
proxy of his valuation, the current bid immediately advances to the minimum of the highest price entered so
far and the second-highest price plus the MBI. This current price formula (1) also implies that the current
price and therefore the selling price need not be restricted to the integer multiplies of the MBI.
 = (  +), (1)
where  denotes the current price at time  and therefore also the revenue for the auctioneer at time
 =  , where  denotes the closing time.  is the highest bid submitted in the auction and  the
second-highest bid at time . A higher MBI level implies that the current price will more often be determined
as the highest bid submitted to the proxy. If the MBI is zero, the price is determined as in a second-price
sealed-bid auction. If the MBI is very high, then the price is determined as in a first-price sealed-bid auction.
With intermediate levels of MBI, an internet auction is a hybrid between these two auction formats.
In Huuto.net, the seller has some control over the auction mechanism. The seller has to set some starting
price, which is equivalent to setting a public reservation price. It is also possible to set a secret reservation
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price. In addition to these parameters, the site oﬀer sellers a wide variety of marketing options. Most
importantly, Huuto.net is ideal for testing theory related to MBIs, because on Huuto.net, it is possible for
the sellers to choose the MBI level. Huuto.net sellers typically set the MBI higher than the smallest possible
level. MBIs of 0.5, 1 and 2 euro are the most common and very small MBIs are rare.
I conduct a field experiment to study how the MBI aﬀects bidding behavior. As a secondary objective, I
also look at how it aﬀects the selling price and the number of observed bidder identities. In this experiment,
I sell Stockmann gift cards. Stockmann is the largest department store chain in Finland. The gift cards
are valid in all of Stockmann’s seven large department stores in Finland. These seven stores are located
in the six largest cities in Finland that together have 1.6 million inhabitants or about 30% of the entire
population. These stores sell millions of diﬀerent commodities and services. These cards can also be spent
in the company’s subsidiary stores like Seppälä, which sells clothes in 90 Finnish cities and towns. Seppälä
is thus easily accessible to most of the Finnish population. These gift cards were chosen for this experiment
mainly because there is a large demand for them. It is very likely that the potential demand for the last card
sold is about the same as for the first card sold. However, this assumption is not necessary for the internal
validity of the experiment; the object was chosen simply to guarantee that each auction generates bid data.
In the first experiment, I sell a total of 72 identical 15 euro Stockmann gift cards. 24 are sold at a 1 cent
MBI. This constitutes the control group. There are two treatment groups, the 33 cent MBI (corresponding
to the eBay level, see Table A1 in the Appendix) and the 50 cent MBI. The second experiment is run in
exactly the same way, with the exception that the cards now have a nominal value of 50 euro, and the MBI
levels are now 1 cent, 66 cent (corresponding to the eBay level) and 100 cent. It would have been interesting
to have one treatment in the experiment at the optimal MBI, but unfortunately this was not possible. To
be able to calculate the optimal MBI for the objects sold in the experiment, I would need to know many
unobservable factors, such as the number of potential bidders and their value distributions, the nature of
the entry process and bidder strategies, quite apart from the fact that the relevant theory for this calculus
does not exist yet either. Therefore, absent a better benchmark, it seems that a natural set-up is to look at
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the MBI level of the largest internet auction site eBay and compare it with the minimum level and a higher
level.
The experiment is conducted with objects that have both a reservation price (the starting price plus the
MBI) and a maximum selling price (the nominal value of the card) within range where eBay would have kept
the MBI the same throughout the auction. For the 15 euro cards, the starting price level was 8 euro (about
$12 at the time of the experiment) in the experiment and the maximum value of the object to buyers was
15 euro (about $22.5). In practice, the 1 cent MBI cards have a 7.99 euro starting price level, the 33 cent
MBI cards 7.67 euro and the 50 cent MBI cards 7.5 euro. Since the first accepted bid is the starting price
level plus the MBI, all the cards have a limit of 8 euro for the first bid to be accepted. In the 50 euro card
experiment, I followed the same logic and set the level of acceptance of the first bid at 30 euro. Within these
price ranges, the MBI level for the 15 euro cards would have been $0.50 (about 33 cents given the exchange
rates around the experiment date) and $1 (about 66 cents) for the 50 euro cards. These reserve prices are
low enough compared to the nominal values of the cards not to be binding. Thus, none of the forthcoming
analysis needs to address the reservation prices. They are simply imposed to make comparison with eBay
MBI levels possible, that is, to keep the bidding always within a single eBay MBI bracket.
I sell all the cards in separate auctions that each last 5 days, from Tuesday afternoon to Sunday afternoon.
12 cards are auctioned at the same time. Both the experiments last six weeks and constitute each of six
12-card batches (clusters) with each batch including 4 cards of each of the diﬀerent MBIs. I randomize the
order in which the cards are placed on the auction within each batch. Note that this set-up creates balanced
variation in the treatment within each cluster. Therefore, even if the auctions within each cluster are not
independent, for example due to the presence of decreasing average transaction costs per card bought or
substitution between the cards, the experiment achieves good power with relatively few observations, when
compared to randomization at the cluster level only. Typical issues impairing experiments with within-
cluster variation include risks of contamination, and ethical, political, administrative or financial reasons
(e.g. Moerbeek 2005). None of these problems are present in my experiment. Moreover, my reputation
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as a seller increased during the experiment, but with within-cluster variation in the treatment this causes
no problems, since this potential eﬀect is easily controlled by adding weekly (cluster) fixed eﬀects to the
regressions. These fixed eﬀects also control for any other unobserved weekly changes.
This experiment is what List (2011), for example, calls a natural field experiment. In these experiments,
real economic agents operate in the real and same environment where they would usually operate, without
knowing that they are participating in an experiment. Therefore the observed treatment eﬀect cannot
be a result of subjects reacting to simply the fact that they are in an experiment and being observed by
researchers. Typically, natural field experiments are very reliable both in the sense of estimating internally
valid causal eﬀect and being broadly generalizable (Al-Ubaydi and List 2013).
One property that gift cards have is that bidders are likely to have private valuations for them, since
there is probably no significant common uncertainty about the value of the objects. Since everyone knows
the nominal value of the cards, the uncertainty is related more to individual bidder characteristics such as
how close the other bidders live to a Stockmann store. What this means is that bidders would not update
their valuations if they learned their competitors’ valuations or signals. Here, common values are not to
be confused with the likely possibility that overall, the uncertainty over the value of gift cards is likely
to be small. However, at least most of the existing uncertainty regarding valuations is essentially private.
For example, bidders may have diﬀerent transaction costs, may discount the future at diﬀerent rates and
have diﬀerent uses for the cards. They would not update their valuations if they learned their competitors’
transaction costs, for example.2 On the other hand, the perceived trustworthiness of the seller, for example,
may be a potential common value component. Moreover, reselling the cards is possible, which would also
imply common values. However, the diﬀerence between selling prices and nominal values will turn out to be
quite small, and therefore the potential gains from reselling are likely to be lower than the transaction costs.
2Because at least some of these private value components are likely to be present, the appropriate model is also very unlikely
to be a one of pure common values without any uncertainty. If this were the case, all bidders would submit the true value of
the object in both the first and second price cases. The data does not support such behavior either, because because bidder
fixed eﬀects turn out to be significant predictors.
7
It is important to note that the information regime is not relevant for the internal validity of the experiment,
although it may play a role in interpreting the results in light of the received theory and in evaluating the
external validity. For example, with independent private values, it could be that a higher MBI would lead to
higher revenue gains than under some other information assumptions such as the aﬃliated values framework.
From the perspective of testing for truthful bidding, Huuto.net has also other attractive properties than
being able to set the MBI. First, Huuto.net applies a soft stopping rule. The soft closing rule on Huuto.net
means that if a bid is submitted when the auction is about to close in less than 5 minutes, 5 minutes are
added to the time that the auction is open. This implies very limited incentives for sniping (Ockenfels and
Roth 2006). Second, Huuto.net also gives preferential treatment to winners who submit their bid to the
proxy earlier than the second-highest bidder. In that case, the winner pays only the second-highest bid,
but not the MBI. Therefore, in the case of early-placed winning bids, Huuto.net auctions are really just
second-price auctions. Both the soft stopping rule and this preferential treatment implies that second-price
sealed bid abstraction would seem to be natural in Huuto.net, which also makes it an ideal market from the
perspective of conservatively testing for truthful bidding. Another but less ideal feature of Huuto.net is that
the bidders are allowed to jump bid. If a jump bidder wins, she pays her bid. Because jump bids are likely
to involve bid shading, auctions won by jump bids are omitted from the truthful bidding testing procedure.
Moreover, jump bidding wins are equally common in all the diﬀerent MBI treatment groups used in the
experiment (see Table 6), which implies that the results concerning the MBI should not be much aﬀected by
the possibility of jump bidding.
On the one hand, these unique features limit the external validity of some of the results, for example how
the results apply to larger sites such as eBay, which diﬀer to some extent from Huuto.net in the exact auction
mechanism that they use. On the other hand, it is important to point out that these diﬀerences are not
likely to hurt the external validity of my results concerning strategic bidding as opposed to truthful bidding.
If bidders who are normal people are strategic and rational on one site, there is no reason to suspect that
similar bidders would not be rational on other sites, even if the equilibrium bidding strategies may diﬀer due
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to the diﬀerent mechanisms. However, these diﬀerences may question the external validity of the revenue
results here. Therefore, I analyze the external validity of especially the revenue results in the Appendix C,
for example by using diﬀerent kinds of subsample analyses.
3 Results
3.1 Revenue and entry eﬀects
One contribution of this paper is the analysis of the revenue eﬀects of MBIs. Because the MBI aﬀects the
probability that the pricing rule in a given auction is either a second-price or a first-price rule, it could have a
significant impact on revenue in situations where the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson 1981 and Riley
and Samuelsson 1981) does not hold (e.g., risk-averse (Maskin and Riley 1984), budget-constrained (Che and
Gale 1998) or asymmetric bidders (Krishna 2002) or bidders with aﬃliated valuations (Milgrom and Weber
1982)). In particular, the revenue maximizing MBI may well be higher than zero in cases where first-price
auctions generate more revenue than second-price auctions.3 However, since these results on revenue and
3Bapna et al. (2003) provide the only other empirical attempt to study the association between the MBI and seller revenue.
They find it to be important both theoretically and empirically when using observational data from B2C online auctions.
However, Bapna et al. (2003) do not address the potential problems regarding unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, their
sampling procedure may introduce a selection bias since they exclude auctions with low participation from their data. Because
low participation may be caused by a high MBI, this selection may result in overestimating the eﬀect of the MBI on revenue.
Rogers et al. (2007) also analyze the MBIs from a theoretical perspective. According to their model and simulations, the
seller can maximize revenue by setting the reservation price to zero and the MBI to an optimal level that is higher than zero.
According to these studies, the MBI seems to be an even more important mechanism parameter than setting the reservation
price optimally, which has been at the center of auction research ever since Myerson’s (1981) seminal contribution. However,
these results hinge on behavioral assumptions regarding bidder behavior. In other words, they are not equilibrium results. The
results in Rogers et al. (2007), for example, require that all bidders submit a single truthful bid.
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entry do not directly test theory, they should be seen more as stylized facts, despite being causal eﬀects
identified by the experiment.
The main questions of interest in this section are the eﬀects of the MBI on the selling price and the
number of actual bidders. I observe the selling price and bidding history in the data. The bidding history is
limited to the current price and the current highest bidder identity after each accepted new bid. Therefore, it
does not reveal the actual bids submitted to the proxy-bidding system. Thus, I cannot use all the submitted
bids in the analysis but rather only the winning bids. Nor does the history reveal the true number of
actual bidders, since a new entrant may place an accepted bid, but I would only observe that particular new
bidder identity if her bid was the highest at the time. Thus, the variable for the number of observed bidder
identities, which I call the number of bidders, is a lower bound or a downwards-biased proxy for the number
of actual bidders. However, there is little reason to assume that the measurement error in this variable is
correlated with the MBI. Therefore, even if the observed levels may be too low, regressing the number of
bidder identities on the MBI treatments should identify the treatment eﬀect of the MBI on entry correctly.
In Table 1, I describe the variables of interest in the first experiment. The mean price is 13.24 euros.
The average price is lowest for the 1 cent MBI and highest for the 33 cent MBI. All the auctions receive
bids from at least two diﬀerent bidders. The average number of bids is lower the higher the MBI is. There
is enough variation in all the response variables to warrant meaningful regression analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 2, I describe the variables of interest in the second experiment. The mean price is 44.46 euros.
The conditional descriptive statistic patterns look exactly as in the first experiment. The average price is
lowest for the 1 cent MBI and highest for the 66 cent MBI. All the auctions receive bids from at least two
diﬀerent bidders and the average number of bidders is lower the higher the MBI is. Again there is much
variation in all the variables.
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[Table 2 about here]
The objects sold are identical in all but two dimensions. Since I randomize the order in which the cards
are placed on the auction within each patch, only the week that they are entered in the auction and the MBI
diﬀer systematically. Therefore I regress the variables of interest on the week fixed eﬀects and the treatment
dummies. Another limitation of my experiment compared to an ideal experiment is that I cannot randomize
over the participating bidders. Unfortunately, it turned out that only 13 diﬀerent bidders participated and
a single bidder won about half of the auctions. This is potentially problematic both for the internal and
external validity of the results due to possible selection of the potential and actual bidders. I will deal with
this issue in the analysis. Firstly, I add the winning-bidder fixed eﬀects in addition to the week fixed eﬀects.4
Secondly, I repeat the analysis using a leave-one-out strategy, where I drop all the auctions won by a given
bidder from the data, one bidder at the time (see Table C3 in the Appendix C). Appendix C provides a
detailed analysis of bidder participation (see Tables C1 and C2).
Since the week fixed and winning bidder fixed eﬀects may not remove all correlations between the error
terms, for example if diﬀerent bidders select into diﬀerent weeks and diﬀerent MBI levels (although they do
not seem to based on Table C2 in the Appendix C), I also report the results clustered either at the week level
or the winning-bidder level or both simultaneously. When I analyze the 15 and 50 euro experiment data
separately, I do not report clustered standard errors due to very small number of clusters. When I pool the
data, I report both one-way clustering at week or winning bidder level and two-way clustering on both levels
simultaneously. However, the number of clusters may be too small for the standard clustering methods to
work properly. Therefore, I have checked that clustering using a wild bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al.
2008) results in even smaller p-values than those reported in Table 6.
The regression results for the 15 euro experiment are presented in Table 3. The auctions with the 1
cent MBI attracted more bidders than the auctions with a higher MBI, but the diﬀerence is not statistically
significant in most cases. Both the eBay level and the highest MBI give the seller more revenue than the
4Using random eﬀects instead of fixed eﬀects does not change the results substantially.
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1 cent MBI and the diﬀerence is statistically significant at the 5% level in the specifications with control
variables included and thus smaller residual variance. There is no statistically significant diﬀerence between
the two higher-level treatments. The revenue point estimate is stable to adding controls, which suggests that
the randomization works as intended.
[Table 3 about here]
The results for the 50 euro experiment are presented in Table 4. The auctions with a 1 cent MBI receive
more bids than the auctions with a higher MBI. The diﬀerence is typically statistically significant, especially
for the highest MBI. The eBay level gives the seller more revenue than the 1 cent MBI, but the diﬀerence
is statistically significant only at the 10% level and only in the richest specification. There is a statistically
significant diﬀerence between the two higher-level treatments in one specification. The results are again very
stable to adding controls.
[Table 4 about here]
In order to get more power out of the experiments, I pool the data. To run the pooled regressions on
price, I construct a new variable called "discount". This is calculated by dividing the selling price by the
nominal value of the card. It is very interesting to note that this discount is very much the same in both the
experiments. The average value of the "discount" is 0.88 in the 15 euro and 0.89 in the 50 euro experiment.
One interpretation of this evidence is that transaction costs are not very important, since a fixed transaction
cost should make the average of the "discount" variable higher for the low-value than for the high-value
cards. It also makes sense now to run a series of pooled regressions, since especially the mean but to a
lesser extent the variance (0.013 for 15 euro and 0.026 for 50 euro data) of the response variable are about
the same in both the experiments. In the pooled regressions, I treat both mid-level MBIs (33 cents for
the 15 euro experiment and 66 cents for the 50 euro experiment) as one single treatment dummy and both
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high-level MBIs (50 cents for the 15 euro experiment and 100 cents for the 50 euro experiment) as another
treatment dummy. If e.g. 33 cents in 15 euro experiment is not the same thing as 66 cents in the 50 euro
experiment, this could result in attenuation bias due to measurement error. Given significant results, this
does not impose an issue for qualitative interpretations of the results.
According to the pooled results in Table 5, higher MBI levels decrease entry. Moreover, I find a stable
revenue eﬀect both in terms of statistical significance and the level, again suggesting valid randomization.
Using the eBay level increments increases seller revenue compared to using the 1 cent MBI by an average of
0.84% of the nominal value (or by 1% of the average selling price) in the richest specification. This result
is statistically significant at least at the 5% level, except in specification (1), where I do not yet control
for anything. In summary, my experiment reveals that the MBI is a relevant determinant of online auction
revenues, both in statistical and economic terms. Because in most Internet auctions sellers cannot set the
MBI, these revenue results may not be of much interest to a typical real-world seller. However, they could
be of some interest to some auctions sites contemplating their designs. The revenue eﬀects estimated here
are joint eﬀects of MBIs in a sense that I cannot quantify the role of possible diﬀerent causal channels. I
do not have independent variation to separate between e.g. the negative revenue eﬀects of higher MBI due
to less entry, the direct positive revenue eﬀects caused by higher MBI as in Eq. (1) and the eﬀects due to
strategic reactions to MBI.
Being a randomized trial with identical objects, the internal validity of these results is very strong.
However, the external validity may be less strong for three reasons: The results may not generalize in
respect of the characteristics of the bidders, the objects sold and the auction site. I discuss these external
validity issues extensively in the Appendix C and conclude that the results may be also of wider relevance.
[Table 5 about here]
We learn three important things from these revenue and entry results from the perspective of understand-
ing which theories are able to explain the evidence. First, the results are not consistent with incremental
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bidding. Second, the results are consistent with truthful bidding with sequential entry. Third, the results
are also consistent with bid-shading under situations where the first-price auction revenues are larger than
second-price auction revenues.
Rogers et al. (2007) show that under incremental bidding, the revenue should be decreasing in MBI.
Therefore, the result that a low level MBI does worse in terms of revenue than higher levels, is not consistent
with incremental bidding. Moreover, the incremental model advocated by Zeithammer and Adams (2010)
for eBay cannot explain why sellers on Huuto.net often choose a high MBI. Neither does the bid history that
I observe support incremental bidding as the typical behavior, because it is rare to observe the same bidder
identity many times in the bid history of a single object.5 Ruling out incremental bidding is relevant later
on when I construct a test for bid-shading. Zeithammer and Adams (2010) show that the MBI together
with incremental bidding imply that the first and second bids may be downward-biased from true first and
second valuations. Therefore, telling bid-shading apart from incremental bidding is challenging empirically.
The formula for the current price (Eq. 1) reveals immediately how the expected current price and therefore
the expected selling price is strictly increasing in MBI assuming truthful bidding. With a suﬃciently high
MBI, the pricing rule is always first-price, and with truthful proxy-bidding, the auctioneer can collect all the
rents. Therefore the analysis of revenue under truthful proxy-bidding is interesting only with an additional
feature, namely entry. Rogers et al. (2007) introduce sequential entry to the model. In their model, bidders
come to the auction site randomly and sequentially. The higher the MBI, the higher the chance is that
a new arrival is not willing to submit any bid, even if he has the highest valuation, because the current
price plus the MBI is more likely to be higher than his valuation when the MBI is higher. In this case, the
highest-value bidder is deterred and revenue (as well as eﬃciency) is lost. With truthful proxy-bidding and
sequential entry, the expected revenue is higher than the second-highest valuation but by an amount less
than the MBI. In this case, there is an optimal value for the MBI that is higher than zero. The entry results
5The average of (observed bids/observed bidder identities) over all the auctions is 1.4, which is way too small for incremental
bidding to be an often applied strategy. Moreover, even if only a single bid is submitted by one bidder, many bids from her
may appear in the bidding history (see previous discussion on the entry data).
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reveal that potential eﬃciency and revenue loss due to entry is a relevant concern for the auctioneer and the
revenue results alone cannot reject truthful bidding.
In the strategic bidding model, increasing the MBI may increase expected seller revenue in the cases
where the first-price auction revenue is known to dominate the second-price auction revenue, such as the
cases of risk-averse or budget constrained bidders, because by increasing the MBI the seller increases the
probability that an internet auction behaves as a first-price auction instead of a second-price auction. Thus,
the revenue results are also consistent with strategic bid shading.
3.2 Testing truthful bidding
In this section, I test for truthful bidding. Moreover, I analyze whether the results are consistent with bid
shading increasing in MBI as the equilibrium result by Hickman (2010) requires. For the main contribution
of this paper, which is testing whether the bidders are rational in a sense of responding to MBI in a way that
is consistent with an equilibrium, this is enough. Moreover, if truthful bidding is rejected, we can conclude
that the second-price auction (whether sealed-bid or ascending) framework is not the correct model for the
analysis of internet auctions. The test hypothesis is formulated as:
0: Truthful bidding
1: MBI aﬀects bidding strategies
I use the bid history data (current price and current winner identity) to infer which auctions used which
of the four the possible price rules. In Table 6, I show these pricing rules, how a given pricing rule is identified
based on the bid history and what we know about the valuations under each pricing rule when we assume
0. Moreover, Table 6 reports how the use of diﬀerent pricing rules is distributed over auctions with diﬀerent
values of MBI. I denote the winning or selling price by  , the highest bid by  and the second-highest
bid by .  and  denote the time when these bids are submitted.  denotes valuation and  : 
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is the highest order statistic among  realizations of a random variable and (−1) :  is the second-highest
order statistic.
[Table 6 about here]
It is possible to detect all the diﬀerent pricing rules that are used based on the bid history. Firstly, the
second-price rule with an MBI was used if the last observed price increase is exactly the MBI. Secondly, the
first-price rule was used if the last price increase is smaller than the MBI.6 In my data, only 2% of all the
auctions and 5% of the auctions that ended with the pricing rule determined by equation (1) use this pricing
rule. This is a low number even when accounting for the fact that in a third of my auctions (those with
the 1 cent MBI), the first-price rule is not possible. Moreover, 2% is a very low number compared to the
emphasis I put on the pricing equation (1). However, its low realization in my data does not mean that the
MBI is not accounted for in the bidding strategies, because bidding is based on the expectations over the
pricing rule rather than its realizations. Thirdly, the last price increase can be higher than the MBI only
if a jump bid wins the auction. Fourthly, the last price increase can be zero only if an early proxy bidder
wins the auction. Due to the use of this preferential treatment of early bidders, it is harder to reject the
null hypothesis than it would be if the same experiment was run without this preferential treatment. In an
alternative analysis, I use the early winner auctions as a separate group and test whether those auctions are
absent of bid-shading as they should.
The main idea of the test is that MBI cannot aﬀect the valuations that bidders have for the sold objects. If
the calculated value distributions diﬀer for the diﬀerent MBIs, it means that the MBI has to have aﬀected the
bidding strategies. To achieve this, I compare the valuation distributions under diﬀerent MBIs by utilizing
6 In Hickman’s (2010) eBay data, about 22% of the auctions used the first-price rule. This may seem to be surprising, because
on eBay, the MBIs are quite small compared to the current prices. However, this is not the correct comparison. The ex-ante
probability of the first-price rule is determined by the diﬀerence between the highest valuation and the second-highest valuation
relative to the MBI. This probability may be high even if the MBI is low relative to the current price.
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order statistics as in Table 6. Only the winning price data can be used, because I do not observe and cannot
infer the other proxy bids. This calculation strategy assumes 0. I should emphasize that this assumption
does not need to be correct for the purposes of testing. On the contrary, the test will reveal whether this
assumption made in the calculation is correct. Auctions with a jump bid winner are omitted because it is
not realistic to assume 0 for them. To simplify testing, I also exclude the cases that used the first-price
rule. The test hypotheses for the two experiments are:
0:  (| = 1  = 15) =  (| = 33  = 15) =  (| = 50 = 15)
1: (| = 1  = 15) 6=  (| = 33 = 15) or  (| = 1 = 15) 6=
 (| = 50  = 15) or  (| = 33  = 15) 6=  (| = 50 = 15), and
0:  (| = 1  = 50) =  (| = 66  = 50) =  (| = 100 = 50)
1:  (| = 1 = 50) 6=  (| = 66 = 50) or  (| = 1  = 50) 6=
 (| = 100  = 50) or (| = 66  = 50) 6=  (| = 100  = 50).
Alternatively, I can again pool the data from the separate experiments together and test for:
0:  (| = 1) =  (| = eBay level) =  (| = high)
1: (| = 1) 6=  (| = eBay level) or  (| = 1) 6=  (| = high) or  (| =
eBay level) 6=  (| = high).
Whether these distribution are the same can be tested with a number of standard tests. I will conduct
two types of testing. First, and most importantly, I will conduct a nonparametric test that does not require
any assumptions concerning the distribution of valuations or the number of potential bidders  . Here, I
will simply use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test whether the empirical cumulative distribution functions
(ecdfs) of the observed (−1): (as calculated in Table 6) are the same for diﬀerent levels of MBI. Before
testing, I divide the calculated valuations by the nominal value  = 15 or 50 for the respective experiment.
The minor limitation of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that it is designed for continuous distributions,
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whereas I am testing between discrete distributions. In the case of discrete distributions, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is conservative (see e.g. Noether 1968), and therefore, I am comfortable with using it. Second,
as a robustness check, I conduct a parametric test that requires more assumptions. This test is discussed
and reported in the Appendix B. It largely echoes the findings of the main test.
In Figure 1, I show the distributions for diﬀerent levels of the MBI for the 15 euro and the 50 euro
experiment separately. The distribution for the high MBI auctions is mainly to the left of the others in
both the experiments, as one would expect with rational bidding. The same pattern is observed in Figure 2
for the pooled experiment results. These diﬀerences are present even without any controls. The diﬀerences
become even more striking when I control for the week and winner fixed eﬀects by comparing the ecdfs of
the residuals resulting from regressing the (−1): to the week and winner fixed eﬀects (Figure 2). With
these controls, also the diﬀerence between the mid-range MBI and the low MBI becomes visible. I use the
specification with controls also to conduct the test in a subgroup of auctions that excludes those won by the
single dominant bidder (Figure 3). This is done in order to confirm that the test results are not driven be
the single strong bidder.
The results of testing for diﬀerences in the ecdfs of (−1): (Figure 1) or the residuals (Figures 2 and 3)
formally are presented in Table 7. In line with the Figures, the null of truthful bidding is typically rejected
when the highest MBI level is compared to the lowest or the mid-range level. When the mid-range level is
compared to the lowest level, the diﬀerence is significant only when excluding the auctions won by the largest
bidder from the sample. While this indicates that the results are slightly mixed, the similarities between
the distributions are rejected way too often and occasionally with so low p-values, that these results are
highly unlikely be simply due to chance. Moreover, the direction of the deviations from the null is in all the
cases consistent with strategic rational bidding, even if the diﬀerence is not always significant. Furthermore,
I show in Figure 4 that the empirical cumulative distribution for the 1 cent MBI auctions and those won
by preferentially treated early bidders are practically identical. This is further comforting since one should
not expect bid-shading in either case. To summarize, truthful bidding is rejected, whereas the results are
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consistent with bid shading, and thus, the equilibrium behavior as proposed by Hickman (2010). This is the
main result of the paper.
Overall, this section implies that most of the previous literature that assumes that internet auctions are
second-price auctions is overly simplistic. The result is fundamental for future theoretical work, because it
is not clear how the bidders formulate first-price bidding strategies in this context. Since the number of
potential bidders may be unknown to everyone, and unlike in second-price auctions or incremental bidding,
first-price auction (or Hickman’s (2010) hybrid auction) equilibrium strategies are a function of the number
of potential bidders, it is not immediately clear how to go on analyzing online auction equilibrium bidding.
[Table 7 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
4 Conclusions
In this study, I argue that the MBI is an important yet often overlooked feature of internet auctions. I
conduct a field experiment to study the eﬀects of the MBI especially on bidding strategies, but also on
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seller revenue and entry in internet auctions. The institutional set up of the Finnish internet auction site
Huuto.net allows for a novel field experiment. I sell otherwise identical objects with diﬀerent MBIs. To my
knowledge, this is the first experimental study on this subject. I find that it is optimal for the seller to set
the minimum bid increment level higher than the lowest possible level. I also find that the number of actual
bidders is decreasing in the MBI. Since my experiment reveals that the MBI is a relevant determinant of both
of these outcomes, the eﬀects of the MBI on bidder behavior and auction outcomes should be incorporated
into further analysis of internet auctions.
Importantly, I use a novel econometric test to distinguish between truthful bidding and bid shading as
a strategic equilibrium response to MBI. I reject the truthful bidding hypothesis. This implies that these
auctions cannot be modeled as second-price auctions. This observation challenges the assumptions of many
of the previous studies on internet auctions. It is very important to stress that despite the typical small
size of MBIs relative to the values of auctioned object, the bid-shading imposed by MBI in equilibrium
may have substantial theoretical and empirical relevance. In particular, Hickman et al. (2011) show that if
bidders account for MBIs in bidding strategies, structural empirical estimated based on the truthful bidding
abstraction are substantially biased. Since I show that bidders account for MBIs in bidding strategies, my
study shows that a serious structural empirical analysis of online auctions needs to correctly account for the
MBIs. Finally, the results show that real-world normal people are able to respond rationally and according
to the economic theory on seemingly small changes in the auction design.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the 15 euro experiment.
Sample Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All price 72 13.24 0.20 13 13.65
MBI=1 price 24 13.18 0.20 13 13.51
MBI=33 price 24 13.27 0.18 13 13.65
MBI=50 price 24 13.26 0.22 13 13.52
All bidders 72 3.06 0.98 2 5
MBI=1 bidders 24 3.25 0.99 2 5
MBI=33 bidders 24 3.04 1.08 2 5
MBI=50 bidders 24 2.88 0.85 2 5
Notes: "price" denotes the transaction price at which the object is sold. "bidders" means the number of diﬀerent
bidder identities that are observed to submit bids.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the 50 euro experiment.
Sample Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All price 72 44.46 1.30 41 46.64
MBI=1 price 24 44.31 1.33 41 46
MBI=66 price 24 44.69 1.36 41 46.64
MBI=100 price 24 44.40 1.23 41 45.4
All bidders 72 4.08 0.99 2 7
MBI=1 bidders 24 4.46 0.98 3 7
MBI=66 bidders 24 3.92 1.10 2 6
MBI=100 bidders 24 3.88 0.80 2 5
Notes: "price" denotes the transaction price at which the object is sold. "bidders" means the number of diﬀerent
bidder identities that are observed to submit bids.
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Table 3. Results of the 15 euro experiment.
(1) (2) (3)
MBI33 0.090* 0.090** 0.073**
s.e. 0.054 0.044 0.035
MBI50 0.081 0.081* 0.085**
s.e. 0.060 0.043 0.035
R2 0.04 0.50 0.77
(4) (5) (6)
MBI33 -0.208 -0.208 -0.115
s.e. 0.299 0.209 0.196
MBI50 -0.375 -0.375* -0.250
s.e. 0.266 0.218 0.218
R2 0.02 0.55 0.68
Week FE no yes yes
Winner FE no no yes
Price
Number of Bidders
Notes: N=72. The reference (control) group for the treatment groups is the 1 cent MBI. "MBI33" and "MBI50"
denote dummies for the 33 cent and 50 cent MBI treatments. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *
denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% level and *** 1% level. The null hypothesis for mbi33=mbi50 is not
rejected in any of the specifications.
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Table 4. Results of the 50 euro experiment.
(1) (2) (3)
MBI66 0.380 0.380 0.323*
s.e 0.390 0.239 0.163
MBI100 0.092 0.092 -0.071
s.e 0.371 0.243 0.133
R2 0.02 0.61 0.88
(4) (5) (6)
MBI66 -0.542* -0.542** -0.548**
s.e 0.300 0.223 0.229
MBI100 -0.583** -0.583*** -0.639***
s.e 0.257 0.196 0.198
R2 0.07 0.55 0.57
Week FE no yes yes
Winner FE no no yes
Price
Number of Bidders
Notes: N=72. The reference (control) group for the treatment groups is the 1 cent MBI. "MBI66" and "MBI100"
denote dummies for the 66 cent and 100 cent MBI treatments. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
* denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% level and *** 1% level. The null hypothesis for mbi66=mbi100 is
rejected only in specification (3) at the 5% level.
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Table 5. Pooled results of both experiments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 0.0068 0.0068** 0.0084*** 0.0084** 0.0084*** 0.0084**
s.e 0.0043 0.0028 0.0023 0.0032 0.0020 0.0026
Treatment 2 0.0036 0.0036 0.0043* 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043
s.e 0.0042 0.0028 0.0023 0.0037 0.0026 0.0026
R2 0.02 0.59 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment 1 -0.375 -0.375** -0.404*** -0.404** -0.404** -0.404**
s.e 0.236 0.153 0.146 0.177 0.184 0.180
Treatment 2 -0.479** -0.479*** -0.505*** -0.505** -0.505 -0.505
s.e 0.216 0.146 0.144 0.210 0.298 0.292
R2 0.03 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Week FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Winner FE no no yes yes yes yes
Clustering no no no week winner two-way
Discount
Number of Bidders
Notes: N=144. The reference (control) group for both the treatment groups is the 1 cent MBI. "Treatment 1" and
"Treatment 2" denote dummies for the mid-level and high-level MBI treatments respectively. All the standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity. In the last three columns, the standard errors are clustered either at the week
level, at the winning bidder identity level or at both levels simultaneously using two-way clustering (the method of
Cameron et al. (2006) is implemented with ivreg2 in STATA). The clustered significance levels are corrected for
the small number of clusters. Moreover, using the wild bootstrap procedure to account for the small number of
clusters produces even smaller p-values than reported here (this is checked with the Cameron et al. (2008) method
as implemented by cgmwildboot in STATA, but not reported here). * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5%
level and *** 1% level. The null hypothesis for Treatment 1 = Treatment 2 is rejected only in specifications (5) and
(6) at the 5% level.
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Table 6. Pricing rules and valuation distribution estimation.
Pricing rule Timing Bid history Valuation calculus
 =  + (eq. (1))     −  =  − = (−1):
 =  (eq. (1))     −    Not conducted
 =  (jump bid) not relevant  −    Not conducted
 =  (early winner)     −  = 0  = (−1):
Shares  All  = 1  = 33|66  = 50|100
 =  + (eq. (1)) 48% 30% 56% 57%
 =  (eq. (1)) 2% 0% 5% 2%
 =  (jump bid) 23% 21% 23% 24%
 =  (early winner) 28% 49% 16% 19%
Table 7. Testing for diﬀerences in the empirical cumulative distribution functions
MBI 1 vs. 33 1 vs. 50 33 vs. 50 1 vs. 66 1 vs. 100 66 vs. 100
p-value, KS-test 0.1813 0.0050 0.4614 0.6821 0.0041 0.0063
MBI 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2
p-value, KS-test 0.8217 0.0096 0.0192 0.2453 0.0008 0.0404
MBI 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2
p-value, KS-test 0.0240 0.0000 0.0010 0.0832 0.0005 0.0282
week and winner FE as controlsno controls
Pooled, excluding the largest bidder
15 euro experiment, no controls 50 euro experiment, no controls
Testing for differences in the ecdf's
Pooled, no controls Pooled, week and winner FE as controls
Notes: "1" refers to the 1 cent MBI. "T1" and "T2" denote the mid-level and high-level MBI treatments respec-
tively.
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Figure 1. Empirical cumulative distributions for the valuations calculated under H0 for 15
and 50 euro experiments.
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Notes: The green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the mid-range MBI auctions
and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction.
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Figure 2. Empirical cumulative distributions for the valuations calculated under H0 or
residuals of these valuation (given week and winner fixed eﬀects) for the pooled data.
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Notes: The green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the mid-range MBI auctions
and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction. The right hand graph represents empirical cumulative distri-
bution functions of residuals from regressing (valuation (−1):/nominal value) on week and winner fixed eﬀects.
The left hand graphs represents empirical cumulative distribution functions of these valuations.
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Figure 3. Empirical cumulative distributions for the valuations calculated under H0 or
residuals of these valuation (given week and winner fixed eﬀects) for the pooled data, exclud-
ing auctions won by the largest bidder from the sample.
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Notes: The green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the mid-range MBI auctions
and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction. The right hand graph represents empirical cumulative distri-
bution functions of residuals from regressing (valuation (−1):/nominal value) on week and winner fixed eﬀects.
The left hand graphs represents empirical cumulative distribution functions of these valuations. The auctions won
by the bidder who won most auctions in the entire experiment are omitted.
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Figure 4. Empirical cumulative distributions for the valuations calculated under H0 for the
pooled data for the auctions where an early bidder won or MBI=1.
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Notes: In the left-hand-picture, the green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the
mid-range MBI auctions and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction. In the right-hand-picture the red
dotted line represents the auctions won by an early bidder and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A1: MBI schedule in eBay.
Current Price Bid Increment
$ 0.01 - $ 0.99 $ 0.05
$ 1 - $ 4.99 $ 0.25
$ 5 - $ 24.99 $ 0.50
$ 25 - $ 99.99 $ 1.00
$ 100 - $ 249.99 $ 2.50
$ 250 - $ 499.99 $ 5.00
$ 500 - $ 999.99 $ 10.00
$ 1000 - $ 2499.99 $ 25.00
$ 2500 - $ 4999.99 $ 50.00
$ 5000 and up $ 100.00
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Appendix B: Parametric test of truthful bidding
In this Appendix, I will use a t-test to analyze whether the structurally estimated parameters of the
underlying valuation distributions are the same for diﬀerent levels of MBI. The estimation of these parameters
requires more assumptions than the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and should thus be seen only as
a robustness check. First, estimating these model primitives requires information on the number of potential
bidders,  .  is unknown, but it can be assumed to be the same, certainly within each batch, and perhaps
also within each experiment. I use the total number of diﬀerent bidder identities observed in all the auctions
in the entire experiment as  . This happens to be 8 for both the experiments. Given balanced batches
in respect of diﬀerent MBI levels, the assumption regarding  should not influence the results to a large
extent. To check this I also confirmed that results are robust to some alternatives values of  .7
Given  and the pricing rule, I can use the order statistic formula and estimate the distribution of the
valuations  either with non-parametric or parametric techniques.8 I use parametric approach due to the
small number of observations to get more power. The assumption on the functional form is the second main
assumption for this testing approach. I estimate the parameters of a Weibull distribution that is upper-
truncated at 1. Upper-truncation is warranted, because I have divided the calculated valuations (−1):
(see Table 6) by the nominal value of the sold cards. The Weibull specification is chosen because it is
fairly flexible. Experimental data is useful in this exercise, because there are no observable or unobservable
characteristics that need to be controlled for, with the possible exception of the week and winner fixed eﬀects.
However, these were shown not to aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the revenue results and only managed to reduce
the standard errors. Therefore, not including week or winner fixed eﬀects should work against rejecting 0.
Nonetheless, I also report in Table B1 results that include these controls. I control for the week and winner
7 I checked that the results are qualitatively the same as in Table B1 for  = 6 and  = 15 for the pooled experiment with
controls. These results are not reported, but they are available from the author.
8A more sophisticated approach to estimate the model primitives also without the need to assume  is provided by Song
(2004). However, the bid history in Huuto.net does not contain the necessary information for such analysis. I would need to
observe two valuations with known ranks which is not possible without ambiguity.
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fixed eﬀects by estimating the Weibull distribution of the residuals resulting from regressing the (−1):
to the week and winner fixed eﬀects. I also scale these residuals by adding the regression model constant to
the residuals to avoid having negative values when estimating the parameters of the Weibull functions.
In Table B1, I present the testing results. The top panel is simply showing the estimated parameters of the
Weibull distributions and, somewhat trivially, whether they diﬀer from zero for the individual experiments
separately. The results for testing between the diﬀerences between the estimated parameters of these Weibull
distributions are presented in the second panel. Likewise, the parameter estimates for the pooled data with
(Figures B2) and without controls (Figures B1) are presented in the third panel, and the main test results
for them in the fourth. The evidence is fairly consistent in showing that the distributions for the highest
MBI levels diﬀer from the other two distributions. Therefore, I reject the 0 of truthful bidding also with
this test. Moreover, a further out-of-sample piece of evidence supporting this result to follow from Hickman
(2010)-type bid-shading as a reaction to the MBI is that the observed pattern is similar to what Hickman
et al. (2011) find in their Monte Carlo analysis. They compare estimations based on truthful bidding in the
presence of an MBI to the true value distributions (and estimates that account for the MBI). They find that
truthful estimates are located to the left and have a higher peak than the true distribution. This pattern is
replicated in my experiment because a higher MBI leads either to a higher peak or a location to the left of
the distributions with a lower MBI, although these patterns are not always statistically significant.
There is a potential risk of over-interpretation of the data involved in this testing approach, because I
have treated each auction as an iid observation in the estimation. There are various realistic reasons for the
observations not to be iid. First, it is possible that a new draw of a given bidder is closer to her own old draw
than the draw of some other bidder. This seems to be likely, given for example the large share of auctions won
by bidder 1. This would be the case of asymmetric bidders, where a separate valuation distribution should be
estimated for each bidder. However, in online auctions the possible diﬀerences between the bidders are not
likely to be commonly observed, thus making the bidder symmetry the appropriate model. Moreover, the
symmetry assumption is standard in empirical online auction literature. Furthermore, even if the symmetry
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assumption was unrealistic, it is not likely to bias the comparison of the treatments, because each bidder
wins about the same amount of auctions in each treatment (see Table C2). A worse, yet possible case is
that bidders draw valuations only once. In that case, I have been replicating data. However, if that is really
the case, there should have been less variation in prices under truthful bidding than I observe in the data.
Furthermore, the distribution from which valuations are drawn may change over time, for example as a
function of items won in the past. However, if this was likely to confound the test here, it should also have
aﬀected the revenue results earlier, which it did not based on the week fixed eﬀects results. Moreover, week
(and winner) fixed eﬀects are controlled for in some of the results in Table B1.
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Table B1. Alternative test results.
MBI 1 33 50 1 66 100
Location 0.862*** 0.861*** 0.854*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.86***
se 0.0042 0.0032 0.0038 0.0084 0.0092 0.0042
Shape 30.0*** 39.1*** 40.0*** 13.8*** 13.9*** 30.0***
se 5.70 9.94 9.67 2.35 2.66 5.70
MBI 1 vs. 33 1 vs. 50 33 vs. 50 1 vs. 66 1 vs. 100 66 vs. 100
Location 0.0013 0.0080 0.0067 -0.0087 -0.0039 -0.0048
se 0.0053 0.0056 0.0049 0.0094 0.0125 0.0101
Shape -9.08 -9.97 -0.90 -0.16 -16.27** -16.1**
se 8.99 11.22 11.90 3.55 6.17 6.29
MBI 1 T1 T2 1 T1 T2
Location 0.856*** 0.855*** 0.858*** 0.891*** 0.890*** 0.881***
se 0.0051 0.0054 0.0031 0.0024 0.0024 0.0026
Shape 17.0*** 16.76*** 30.1*** 37.1*** 39.4*** 36.9***
se 2.12 2.19 4.15 4.67 5.07 4.97
MBI 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2 1 vs. T1 1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T2
Location 0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0026 0.0016 0.011*** 0.0094***
se 0.0074 0.0059 0.0062 0.0034 0.0035 0.0035
Shape 0.273 -13.0*** -13.31*** -2.26 0.17 2.43
se 3.04 4.66 4.69 6.89 6.82 7.10
Location and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution
Testing for differences in the Weibull parametes
15 euro experiment 50 euro experiment
Pooled Pooled with controls
Location and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution
Testing for differences in the Weibull parametes
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and * at 10%.
37
Figure B1. Estimated cumulative Weibull distributions and Weibull densities for the valu-
ations calculated under H0 for the pooled data.
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Notes: The green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the mid-range MBI auctions
and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction.
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Figure B2. Estimated cumulative Weibull distributions and Weibull densities for the valu-
ations calculated under H0 for the pooled data with controls.
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Notes: The green connected line represents the high MBI auction, the red dotted line the mid-range MBI auctions
and the black semi-dotted line the low MBI auction.
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Appendix C: External validity
In this Appendix, I study to what extent the results may generalize in respect of the characteristics of the
bidders, the objects sold and the auction site. The first reason is related to whether the bidders represent
a typical set of bidders in internet auctions. For example, more experienced bidders may behave in a more
sophisticated way and more in line with equilibrium than less experienced bidders (see e.g. Harrison and
List 2008). I analyze the set of participants in Table C1. I describe how many auctions each of the observed
bidders won. Altogether 13 diﬀerent bidder identities are observed in the data. 8 diﬀerent identities won
auctions in the first experiment and 8 in the second, of which 3 were also winners in the first experiment. A
large share of the auctions are won by bidder 1. She dominates especially the first experiment, which may
be a concern for the external validity of these results. Besides winning most of the objects, this bidder pays
on average the lowest prices. The issue in the first experiment is that, although there are many diﬀerent
bidders that participate in these auctions, one bidder wins most of the auctions. It is tempting to argue
that the results could have been diﬀerent if that particular bidder was not present. On the other hand, this
particular bidder does not dominate the second experiment and yet the results are very similar in both the
first and the second experiment. Moreover, the price is not determined by the winning bidder alone, as in
standard first-price auctions, but rather as a joint function of both the highest and the second-highest bid, as
can be seen from equation (1). In these experiments, there is much more variation in the sets of participants
than there is in the winner identities. For these reasons, the external validity of these results with respect
to bidders should be fairly strong.
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Table C1. How many auctions each bidder won.
bidder w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 w10 w11 w12 total price 15 price 50
1 11 12 6 12 5 9 4 11 8 78 13.16 43.1
2 1 1 2 13.35 45
3 4 4 13.45 NA
4 1 1 2 13.49 NA
5 1 1 13.5 NA
6 5 4 9 13.51 45.02
7 2 2 13.5 NA
8 2 2 13.42 NA
9 7 7 NA 45.13
10 1 1 2 NA 43.52
11 8 9 17 NA 44.87
12 4 4 NA 45.72
13 12 2 14 NA 45.39
Notes: "w1-w6" denotes weeks 1 to 6 , which constitute the first experiment. "w7-w12" are the weeks of the second
experiment. "price 15" denotes the average winning bid of each bidder in the first experiment and "price 50" in the
second experiment.
To evaluate the previous arguments concerning the robustness of the results in respect of the set of
bidders, I report two separate pieces of evidence in Tables C2 and C3. In Table C2, I show the number of
auctions that each bidder wins in each MBI category. There is no systematic evidence in Table C2 implying
that some bidders prefer some MBI levels over others. In Table C3, I show the results of the leave-one-out
type revenue regressions. To be more specific, in Table C3, I report results where I omit all auctions won by
a single bidder from the data, one winner at a time. The six smallest winners are dropped out together. I
include the week fixed eﬀect, but not the winner fixed eﬀect, because here the winner eﬀects are analyzed by
dropping out data. All the results are qualitatively similar to the full sample results. None of the Treatment
1 eﬀects are statistically significantly diﬀerent from the comparable full sample eﬀect (0.068) and all of them
are significantly diﬀerent from zero, at least at the 10% level.
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Table C2. Distribution of wins over treatments for each bidder
bidder statistics MBI=1 treatment 1 treatment 2
1 obs 27 26 25
mean 0.870 0.877 0.873
6 obs 5 1 3
mean 0.901 0.900 0.901
9 obs 1 3 3
mean 0.900 0.909 0.897
11 obs 6 5 6
mean 0.896 0.896 0.900
13 obs 5 5 4
mean 0.910 0.911 0.900
rest obs 4 8 7
mean 0.885 0.902 0.901
Notes: "obs" denotes the number of auctions that a given bidder wins in each treatment group. "mean" denotes the
mean of price/(nominal value). "rest" denotes bidders 2,3,4,5,7,8,10 and 12 together.
Table C3. Results when data won by a given bidder is omitted.
Omitted auctions won by bidder: 1 2,4,5,7,8,10 3 6
Treatment 1 0.0042* 0.0061* 0.0057** 0.0081***
s.e. 0.0020 0.0026 0.0024 0.0025
Treatment 2 -0.0009 0.0032 0.0031 0.0032
s.e. 0.0038 0.0018 0.0017 0.0027
N 66 133 140 135
Omitted auctions won by bidder: 9 11 12 13
Treatment 1 0.0065** 0.0072** 0.0064** 0.0075**
s.e. 0.0028 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030
Treatment 2 0.0039* 0.0035 0.0037* 0.0053***
s.e. 0.0020 0.0023 0.0020 0.0010
N 137 127 140 130
Notes: The response variable is "discount". All the specifications include week fixed eﬀects but exclude winner
fixed eﬀects. The standard errors are clustered both at the week and winning bidder identity levels using two-way
clustering. The clustered significance levels are corrected for the small number of clusters. * denotes 10% significance
level, ** denotes 5% level and *** 1% level.
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The second potential concern for the external validity of the results is related to whether the objects
sold are a good representation of typical objects sold in internet auctions. One particular concern in that
one may expect more sophisticated bidding when stakes are high because making sophisticated decisions
may involve cognitive decision costs (see e.g. List and Lucking-Reiley 2002). The values of the gift cards
sold here do represent quite typical stakes. More generally, although there were many other types of gift
cards for sale at the same time, only a few other Stockmann gift cards were on sale. Thus the object that
I sell is not perhaps a typical object. On the other hand, there is large heterogeneity in the objects sold in
internet auctions, and thus, there is no such thing as a representative object of sale. Moreover, the presence
of identical or similar objects sold by other sellers may potentially add unnecessary noise to the experiment
since they may aﬀect bidder behavior in the experiment’s auctions. Furthermore, the eﬀect of the MBI
depends more on the bidder characteristics and their strategies, their risk attitudes and the nature of the
entry process than the object characteristics. There should be a huge number of markets where the entry
behavior and bidder characteristics are similar enough to the Stockmann gift card markets to make these
results of external interest. However, one limitation to the generalizability is that the amount of uncertainty
over the valuations may be smaller for gift cards than for many other objects thus making the first-price rule
more common in expectation. On the other hand, in practise, the first-price rule was applied surprisingly
rarely in these data. For these reasons, the external validity of these results also in respect of the objects
sold should be fairly strong.
The main concern for external validity is whether the results apply to any other sites than Huuto.net.
There are several diﬀerences between Huuto.net and the other internet auction sites, most importantly eBay.
One diﬀerence between the auction mechanisms used by Huuto.net and eBay is that the former applies a
soft stopping rule and the latter a strict stopping rule. The soft closing rule on Huuto.net means that if
a bid is submitted when the auction is about to close in less than 5 minutes, 5 minutes are added to the
time that the auction is open. On eBay the closing time is strict. Amazon auctions, for example, also used
a soft closing rule. The stopping rule has implications for equilibrium bidding. In particular, the strategic
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advantages of so-called late bidding or sniping, which is often observed on eBay, are severely attenuated in
auctions that apply an automatic extension rule (Ockenfels and Roth 2006). In Yahoo! auctions, the seller
could set the closing rule. Brown and Morgan (2009) use this feature to construct a field experiment on the
eﬀects of the closing rule. They find that prices and bidder counts are unaﬀected by the auction ending rule.
Therefore it is fair to assume that the generalizability of the revenue results obtained from a field experiment
set-up on Huuto.net is not limited by the particularities closing rule.
There are two other diﬀerences between the two auction sites that are more problematic. Firstly, Hu-
uto.net gives preferential treatment to winners who submit their bid to the proxy earlier than the second-
highest bid. In that case, the winner pays only the second-highest bid. Therefore, in the case of early-placed
winning bids, Huuto.net auctions are really just second-price auctions instead of hybrid auctions that use
the pricing rule (1). In my experiment, 28% of the auctions were won by an early proxy bidder. This set-up
creates further incentives for early bidding beyond the soft closing rule. In my experiment, no last-minute
bidding was observed. Due to this rule, I probably estimate the lower bound for the revenue eﬀects of the
MBI compared to conducting this experiment on eBay, because equation (1) is only relevant for auctions
where a later proxy bidder wins. Therefore, qualitatively speaking my findings should be robust for this
diﬀerence in the pricing rule. Moreover, when testing for bid-shading, the existence of preferential treatment
can be turned into an advantage, since it provides an additional set of auctions where one should not expect
bid-shading to take place.
The second large concern is that bidders are allowed to jump bid. If a jump bidder wins, she pays her
bid. Unlike on eBay, bidders are not forced to use the proxy machine, which is more of an option. 23%
of the auctions in my experiments were won by a jump bid. This is a non-negligible share. Unfortunately,
jump bidding creates many complexities for an analysis of bidding strategies which are clearly beyond the
scope of this paper. In this respect, the external validity is limited. However, jump bidding wins was equally
common in all the three diﬀerent MBI treatment groups, which may imply that the results concerning the
MBI should not be much aﬀected by the possibility of jump bidding. Moreover, I repeat the analysis by
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excluding observations that result in a jump bid winning in Table C4.9 The eﬀects of the MBI on revenue
are slightly smaller in the richest specification and the eﬀect on entry is smaller for this sample than for
the full sample. Therefore it seems that on average jump bidders may be able to deter entry with a high
MBI. However, the diﬀerences with the full sample and the sample excluding jump bids are not statistically
significant. On the other hand, it is worrying that the revenue result is less stable for this subset than for the
full sample. I also account for these diﬀerent rules and strategies in the bidding strategy test by analyzing
only the subsample of data without the auctions won by jump bids.
9The sample in Table C4 also excludes 14 auctions for which I do not observe the pricing rule. This is due to a human error.
Originally, I did not record the information from my experiments on the pricing rule that was used. I added that information
later. Between these two recording events I lost the back-up paper copies of 14 of my auctions while moving oﬃce. This lost
information is not easily recoverable because Huuto.net keeps information on its auctions for 3 months only. However, I have
verified that omitting these 14 observations changes nothing of practical importance relative to Table 5.
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Table C4. Pooled estimation results when auctions won by jump bids are omitted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 0.0136** 0.0082* 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049* 0.0049*
s.e 0.0056 0.0043 0.0031 0.0041 0.0023 0.0024
Treatment 2 0.0115** 0.0081* 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024
s.e 0.0051 0.0044 0.0034 0.0062 0.0035 0.0037
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment 1 -0.067 -0.064 -0.195 -0.195 -0.195 -0.195
s.e 0.262 0.196 0.199 0.287 0.322 0.325
Treatment 2 -0.325 -0.283 -0.367* -0.367 -0.367 -0.367
s.e 0.246 0.194 0.187 0.272 0.340 0.327
Week FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Winner FE no no yes yes yes yes
Clustering no no no week winner two-way
Discount
Number of Bidders
Notes: N=99. The reference (control) group for the treatment groups is the 1 cent MBI. "Treatment 1" and "Treat-
ment 2" denote dummies for the mid-level and high-level MBI treatments. All the standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. In the last three columns, the standard errors are clustered either at the week level, at the win-
ning bidder identity level or at both levels using two-way clustering. The clustered significance levels are corrected
for the small number of clusters. * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% level and *** 1% level.
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